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INTRODUCTION

The 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference (RARC-83) will
serve as a building block for the 1985 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-85).' These conferences are held under the auspices of the

1. The World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Satellite
Orbit and the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It is scheduled to meet August 8September 13, 1985 in Geneva. Calendar, 52-I TELECOM. J. (1985); FCC, Notice, 49 Fed.
Reg. 21,419 (1984). The Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1959) 12 U.S.T. 2377, T.I.A.S. No.
(117)
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International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialized agency of the
United Nations. The ITU manages the electromagnetic spectrum, the entire range of wavelengths or frequencies, and is responsible for virtually all
international telecommunication regulations. Its duties are carried out
through regional and world conferences, such as RARC-83.' The purpose
of RARC-83 was to devise an equitable and efficient plan which assigned
space frequencies and orbital positions for the development of broadcast
satellite services (BSS), including the most technologically advanced Direct
Broadcast Satellite (DBS) services, in the Western Hemisphere (Region 2).
This plan will be proposed for formal incorporation into the ITU's Radio
Regulations at the upcoming WARC-85.
RARC-83 succeeded in allocating high frequency bands and orbital
positions in an equitable and orderly pattern. In order to reach this agreement most participating nations, including the United States, made concessions. Nevertheless, the U.S. was successful in achieving its major objectives for the accommodation of domestic direct DBS, better known as
Direct Broadcast Satellite services. In fact, the plan is flexible enough to
enable future U.S. satellite growth.
Part II of this note presents a brief overview of DBS technology. Part
III surveys the International Telecommunication Union's international regulatory framework. Part IV discusses the RARC-83 plan and the concessions made by member nations during the proceedings. Finally, Part V evaluates the potential for DBS growth in the United States under the RARC83 proposal.
II.

DBS

TECHNOLOGY

A Direct Broadcast Satellite service transmits video programming by
satellite to individual homes through small parabolic ("dish") receiving antennas. The satellite itself is "located in the geostationary orbit, 22,300
miles above the equator"., It receives signals from earth and retransmits
them to receiving antennas installed at individual homes." Satellite technology is such that a more powerful satellite transmission requires less sophis-

4893, are amended at each conference; the most recent revisions are contained in the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations Hearings, May 18, 1982, infra note 35. See infra notes 36-49
and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
3. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE FACT SHEET

1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as FCC, FACT SHEET]. The "dishes" are approximately 2.5 feet in
diameter. Id.
4. Id.
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ticated and less costly ground receiving antennas. 5 Direct broadcasting
satellites transmit such a high power signal that they require only a small,
inexpensive antenna and receiving equipment."
Conventional communications satellites (non-high frequency technology) are relatively low in power and require very expensive and elaborate
earth receiving stations. Their programs are transmitted by satellite from
one large central earth station to a similar receiving earth station and are
then transmitted by broadcast facilities, e.g., TV stations. These "fixed"
satellites perform a distribution rather than a broadcast function. 7 Thus,
"the big difference between DBS and other similar services is that DBS
'bypasses' the local' TV station and instead is transmitted directly into the
consumer's home."
According to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), a DBS
system can:
Provide service to remote areas currently with little or no television
service.
b. Make available additional channels of TV programming throughout the country.
c. Bring individualized programming to viewers by tailoring programs
to small audiences with specialized tastes.
d. Provide innovative services such as high definition TV, stereophonic
sound, telex and dual-language sound tracks.
e. Provide a variety of non-entertainment services, including educational programming and transmission of medical data.'
a.

Proponents of DBS systems contend that DBS signals will supplement

5. A. CHAYES, P. LASKIN & M. PRICE, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES: POLI3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A. CHAYES].
6. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-84-157, U.S. OBJECTIVES GEN-

CIES AND PROBLEMS
ERALLY

ACHIEVED

AT

BROADCASTING

SATELLITE

INTERNATIONAL

CONFER-

ENCE-IMPROVEMENTS CAN HELP IN FUTURE CONFERENCES 2 [hereinafter cited as GAO,
OBJECTIVES]. The receiving equipment is attached to a conventional television set to convert

the signal to the appropriate viewing frequency. The cost of all necessary equipment to enable
viewing on a conventional television set should be no more than $500. FCC, FACT SHEET,
supra note 3, at 2.
7. A. CHAYES, supra note 5, at 2. However, GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 2, states,
"Reception of these lower-power conventional 'fixed' satellites has typically required dish antenna receivers up to 20 feet wide and costing thousands of dollars."
The difference between "fixed" satellite broadcasting and DBS broadcasting methods is
illustrated in APPENDIX I.
8. FCC, FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 3.
9. Id. at 1.

120

MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE

[Vol. 9

current television sources, not simply compete for television viewers. 10 In
addition, a more competitive environment may force the broadcasting industry to provide services which fit the demands of society more accurately.
To generate the proper operation of market forces and thus guarantee the
best possible service, the FCC recommends that DBS services be allowed to
operate as flexibly as possible, that is, with little or no regulation.1
III.
A.

BACKGROUND FOR THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO
CONFERENCE

History and Policies of the International Telecommunication Union

The International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) origin can be
traced to the signing of the 1865 International Telegraph Convention in
Paris."2 At this conference, the first multilateral agreements for the development of radio communications were signed and the International Telegraph Union was formed to regulate international telegraph transmissions
and to establish an administrative structure. The Union expanded its functions and administrative structure as new communication technologies developed, e.g., telephones."3 In 1932, the International Telegraph Union
merged with the International Radio Telegraph Union, created in 1906,
and other international organizations dealing with telephone, telegraph, and
radio to become a central international bureau, known as the International
Telecommunication Union. 4
Today the ITU is a specialized agency of the United Nations and is
responsible for all international telecommunications regulation. The agency

10. GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 2.
ii. FCC, FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 4. In support of their view that no further regulation of DBS is necessary, the FCC maintains that:
[A]n abundance of programming from such varied sources will provide assurance of
enough competition to force operators to attempt to meet consumer preferences. It will
also make available a greater variety of programming, much of it directed at specialized
audiences, and will expand the opportunity for new talents and points of view to gain
expression. The operators in this market will serve the public interest best if they are
allowed as much flexibility as possible to provide the programming technical services and
financial arrangements that consumers desire.
Id.
12. E. MCWHINNEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 51 (1971).

The

French text of the International Telegraph Convention, May 17, 1865, may be found in 130
Parry's T.S. 198.
13. E. PLOWMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 227 (1982).
14. E. MCWMINNEY, supra note 12, at 52; Rothblatt, ITU Regulation of Satellite Communication, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1982).
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is defined by its "Convention", a dual purpose document which establishes
the structure and general purpose of the ITU, and sets out the relevant law.
This instrument must be "re-adopted in toto by each ITU Plenipotentiary
Conference, the supreme organ of the Union."'"
The technical standards for DBS are suggested by a permanent committee of the ITU, namely the International Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR). The CCIR conducts studies and makes non-binding recommendations about technological developments to the Administrative Conferences.
The International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), another permanent committee of the ITU, serves a regulatory function by implementing
the Radio Regulations (developed in administrative conferences) and maintaining the Master Register which lists the frequencies assigned to member
nations. 16
The ITU's rule-making functions are carried out by Administrative
Conferences which convene only when there is a need to revise their regulations. Once adopted by a conference, these rules are binding upon the 157
member nations as additions to the Convention. 17 The conferences are responsible for allocating the radio frequency spectrum for all types of satellites.1 8 The conferences, held on regional and world-wide levels, "include
the World Administration Radio Conferences (WARCs), which meet infrequently to discuss specific topics, the Regional Administrative Radio Conferences (RARCs), which convene to discuss communications problems of a
regional scope, and the Plenipotentiary Conferences," which decide administrative issues. 9
The conferences set up committees, which are responsible for developing solutions to particular problems within specific areas. The committees
then present their proposed resolutions to the entire conference body for
approval. A general consensus of all member nations must be reached
before any committee rules or assignments are accepted. The assignments
agreed to in these conferences are Radio Regulations, and are reported and
recorded in the Master Register by the IFRB, and accepted as additions to
0
the Convention.2

15. E. PLOWMAN, supra note 13, at 227. For the original Convention, see Final Acts of
the International Telecommunication and Radio Conference, Atlantic City, 1947.
16. Id.; Georgetown Space Law Group, DBS Under FCC and International Regulation,
37 VAND. L. Rav. 66, 99 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Georgetown].
17. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 99.
18. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 12, at 61. Frequency allocation is important for the coordinated use of the spectrum. Id. at 60-64.
19. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 101.
20. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 12, at 61. Consensus is based on a one vote per country
system. Once accepted as an addition to the Convention, a regulation is binding on all member
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Review of the World Administrative Radio Conferences

The following conferences have been the most significant to the development of DBS: the 1971 Space WARC, the 1977 Broadcasting-Satellite
WARC, the 1979 WARC, and the 1983 RARC 2
1.

WARC-71

The 1971 WARC for Space Telecommunications allocated the operational bands for BSS and established two basic principles for the international regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum-(1) "efficient use" and
(2) "equitable sharing. ' 22 "The[sel twin principles .. .are based on the
valid premise that the resources involved-space service frequencies and the
geostationary orbit-are both finite and a res communes. ' 23 The IFRB traditionally assigned spectrum and orbital frequencies on a "first-come, firstserved" basis to those applicants with the requisite technical ability. Thus,
the first registrants, generally the more developed countries, have requested
and received preferred orbital slots. "
WARC-71 promulgated a resolution expressing the intent that the
mere registration of frequency assignments with the ITU would not establish those assignments as a permanent priority.2 5 The resolution provides:
that the registration with the I.T.U. of frequency assignments for space
radiocommunication services and their use should not provide any permanent priority for any individual country or groups of countries and
should not create an obstacle to the establishment of space systems by
26
other countries.
The 1971 conference also developed rules which restricted unilateral
action in space by imposing obligations to promote efficiency and equity.
The obligations mandate that member nations are:

states. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 104-05. But see discussions of reservation infra at note

63.
Georgetown, supra note 16, at 101.
Final Acts of the World Administrative Conference for Space Telecommunications,
1971, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7435.
Rothblatt, supra note 14, at 7.
24. K. QUEENEY, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 90 (1978).

21.
22.
July 17,
23.

25. Rothblatt, supra note 14, at 9.
26. Final Acts of the World Administrative Conference for Space Telecommunications,
July 17, 1971, Res. No. Spa 2-1, pt. 1, 23 U.S.T. 1527, 1820, T.I.A.S. No. 7435; K.QUEENEY,
supra note 24, at 90.
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(1) to provide the IFRB with basic operational data on any planned
satellite system; (2) to coordinate with foreign administrations in eliminating potential interference; and (3) to design systems in a manner
that would minimize satellite transmissions over foreign territory. 7
WARC-71 succeeded in arranging the frequency channels and the use
of orbital positions and in modifying the technical standards embodied in
the "Table of Frequency Allocations." The conference also adopted a resolution directing later conferences to draft technical criteria, principles, and
plans in an orderly and equitable global pattern.2 8 Thus WARC-71 "set the
direction for the orderly development of the broadcast satellite service."' 9
2.

WARC-77

The plan designed by the 1977 WARC for the planning of the Broadcasting-Satellite Service in the frequency bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions
2 & 3) and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1) emphasized equitable use of space
service by basing allocation on "at least for the 12 GHz band broadcastingsatellite service, a priori assignment of the orbit/spectrum resource."3 0 This
method of assignment derives from stated future needs. Previous ITU policy had been to allocate by a posteriori assignment in which the frequencies
and orbital positions were assigned when a country was technologically capable of utilizing them. 3 ' Under the new plan, every country in Regions 1
(Europe) and 3 (Asia) was granted rights to future use of particular frequencies in conjunction with specific orbital slots.32 One purpose of this allocation was to prevent countries with sufficient technical ability and resources from establishing direct broadcast satellite service to countries
which desired to exclude such transmissions. 8 Region 2 (Western Hemisphere), however, did not participate in the Conference largely because of

27. Rothblatt, supra note 14, at 9. This conference amended the Radio Regulations.
28. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 101; K. QUEENEY, supra note 24, at 94.
29. K. QUEENEY, supra note 24, at 80-81.
30. Final Acts of the World Administrative Conference for the Planning of the Broadcasting-Satellite Service in the Frequency Band 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.712.5 GHz (in Region 1), Geneva, 1977; Rothblatt, supra note 14, at 11.
"The a priori plan approach relies upon specialized administrative conferences to subdivide and allot radio channels or satellite orbit positions to countries in advance of present need
or capacity to use them." Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference: The
ITU in a Changing World, 13 INT'L LAW. 289, 294 n.13 (1979).
31. Id.; Georgetown, supra note 16, at 101.
32. Rothblatt, supra note 14, at 11-14. Technical parameters are identification, location,
and power designations assigned to the satellites.

33. K. QUEENEY, supra note 24, at 212.
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the influence of the United States. 4 Specific arrangements for Region 2
were thus postponed until RARC-83.
3.

WARC-79

The WARC-79 conference made specific recommendations to assure
"equitable access" to the broadcast spectrum for less developed countries
(LDCs). 5 This conference did not specifically discuss DBS issues, but its
results directly affect all satellite systems. 36 It further defined the orbital
slots by segmenting the 12 GHz frequency band. Both fixed and broadcast
satellites had been sharing the 11.7-12.7 GHz band since 1971.11
The resulting plan allocated the 11.7-12.1 GHz band to fixed satellites
and the 12.3-12.7 GHz band to direct broadcast satellites. The two services
were permitted, however, to operate in each other's band under certain conditions and were to share the unassigned 12.1-12.3 band until permanent
rules could be established.38
This separation has allowed orbital positions to be patterned in a more
orderly fashion (i.e., the geostationary orbital arc need not be so segmented), thus keeping with the WARC-71 efficient use principle. In addition, it has created a more interference-free environment in which the development of fixed and direct broadcasting systems can be maximized, and
the equitable access requirement should assure all nations of this
opportunity.3 9

IV.

1983

REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE

A.

Evolution of the 1983 Agreement

The RARC-83 was convened to establish technical standards and procedures for broadcasting satellite service in the Western Hemisphere (Re-

34. See FCC Report and Order, Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. 19,212 (1983); FCC, GENERAL
Doc. No. 80-398; FCC 83-102.
35. Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference, Geneva, 1979 entered into
force Jan. 1, 1982, U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. available in Treaty 97-21, Radio Regulations
(Geneva, 1979) and Final Protocol (The Result of the World Administrative Radio Conference, 1979): Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(May 18, 1982). Hart, A Review of the WARC-79 and its Implicationsfor the Development
of Satellite Communications Services, 12 LAw. Am. U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 442 (1980).
36. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 102.
37. Hart, supra note 35, at 453. GHz is the abbreviation for gigahertz which is defined as
one billion cycles per second and is used to measure the frequency of radio waves.
38. Rothblatt, supra note 14, at 13.
39. Hart, supra note 35, at 453-54.
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gion 2), based on WARC-71, WARC-77, and WARC-79.4 ° The 1983 conference resolved "problems of sharing the designated broadcasting satellite
service radio frequencies with existing [fixed] communications satellite services [(FSS)]," as well as the division of the 12.1-12.3 band."'
RARC-83 was in session for five weeks and set up seven committees to
draft the plan. As a precursor to any committee work, the operational
bandwidth had to be established. The division was made at 12.2 GHz; the
upper half (12.2-12.3) for use by BSS and the lower half (12.1-12.2) for
use by FSS.

2

The final RARC-83 agreement was the result of numerous proposals
from participating nations."3 Most of these nations had to make concessions
on the number of slots and orbital positions and the orbital elevation angles
they desired. 4 The RARC-83 agreement, however, is only a recommended
plan for WARC-85.5
Two factors had significant impact on the development of the 1983
plan. The RARC-83 agreement was premised on an a priori rather than an
a posteriori allocation system, and could only be approved by a consensus
using the one-vote per nation system." These requirements put lesser devel-

40. GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 1. It should be noted that the term direct broadcast satellite (DBS) is used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) when discussing domestic policy matters and BSS is used in regard to international frequency allocation
matters. Id. at I n.l.
For the official version of RARC-83, see Final Acts of the Region 2 Administrative Radio
Conference for the Planning of the 12 GHz Broadcasting-Satellite Service and Associated
Uplinks, Geneva, 1983, available from the General Secretariat of the ITU, International Telecommunication Union, Places des Nations, CH-1211 Geneve 20, Switzerland.
41. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-83-121, U.S. PREPARATIONS
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BROADCAST SATELLITES 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as GAO, PREPARATIONS].
42. B. PATTAN, SUMMARY OF THE TECHNICAL AND PLANNING OUTPUT OF THE REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE (RARC) HELD IN JUNE 1983, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PUB. No. FCC/OST TM84-1 (1984) (hereinafter cited as B. PATTAN].
Each committee was given "terms of reference" to guide it in its decision-making process and
these decisions were all achieved by consensus.
43. Coming to Consensus in Geneva, BROADCASTING, June 18, 1983, at 24 [hereinafter
cited as Consensus in Geneva]. The participating nations at RARC-83 were Argentina, Belize,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Honduras, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Netherlands (Antilles), Peru, Suriname, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America,
Uruguay and Venezuela. GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at app. I.
44. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. U.S. Team Back from Geneva Pleased
with Itself and ITU, BROADCASTING, July 25, 1983, at 27 [hereinafter cited as Back from
Geneva].
45. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 141.
46. Back from Geneva. supra note 44, at 26. The acceptance of the a priori method for
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oped countries (LDCs) in a powerful position because their stated needs
and their votes had the same weight as those of more developed countries.
Cuba initially proposed an overall plan for the allocation of orbital
slots which appealed to smaller countries because it promoted equal access.
Although the advanced countries wished to maintain good relations with
the LDCs, they could not accept the Cuban plan because it would not satisfy their stated needs.' 7 The technologically advanced countries responded
with their own plan, which was essentially a combination of the U.S. and
Canadian plans.18 Fortunately for the advanced countries, their "high capacity" plan provided better protection margins from interference and
"spill-over" than the Cuban plan. In fact, the final consensus, which included Cuba, was that this plan was superior. It will therefore be recommended for adoption at WARC-85.' 9
Under the plan finally adopted, the RARC-83 delegates elected to assign orbital slots to the service areas of Region 2 using the approach suggested by the U.S., that is, a flexible set of procedures which allows use of
the full range of available frequencies, rather than the plan adopted by the
other ITU regions, regions 1 and 3, which assigned specific orbital locations
and frequencies."0 The plan's inherent flexibility permits a wide range of
technical standards and BSS configurations. 51 This flexibility facilitated the
accomplishment of major U.S. goals, including: (1) "obtaining adequate
geostationary orbit and frequency capacity;" and (2) "providing for procedural/technical flexibility and minimal coordination with other nations" to
5
introduce or modify broadcasting satellite service. 1
B.

Issues Resolved by Compromise

The RARC-83 plan was the result of numerous compromises. Countries were required to give and take on a variety of issues, including: (1) the
number of orbital slots and channels, their positions, and the amount of
eclipse protection; (2) the power flux density (satellite signal strength), and

orbital slot assignment was rejected by the United States until RARC-83. The United States
preferred a "first-come, first-served" method for orbital frequency allocations, GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 19.
47. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
48. B. PATTAN, supra note 42, at 16. This plan was also referred to as the high capacity
plan. See also Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
49. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
50. GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 8-10.
51. Id.; Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
52. GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 8-10. The bandwidth division made at the opening of the conference furthered the U.S.'s objectives because it allows adequate spectrum space
for both FSS and BSS. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 103.
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polarization (signal transmission plane); (3) the type of interim system to
be implemented; and (4) political disputes.
1.

Orbital Slots and Channels

Many countries had to make concessions concerning orbital slots and
channels. According to an American delegate on the planning committee,
the South American countries did the most compromising. For instance,
Brazil "gave up one of the six slots it had sought along with the 32 channels
it could have accommodated." 53 Cuba compromised by accepting a less
favorable position at 89* W. Mexico gave up several channels, and accepted
assignments for four orbital positions which differed from their original
IFRB submissions. " Several Caribbean administrations submitted a proposal for a single "Caribbean beam" but were unable to convince the others
of its efficiency. Instead, the Caribbean received "five beams each centered
on a particular country, but also serving contiguous service areas.""
The U.S. requested eight eclipse-protected orbital slots with 36 channels each, all capable of serving two time zones, i.e., "half of the continental United States." 56 Several compromises resulted in the U.S. receiving a
total of eight west longitude slots, each with 32 rather than 36 channels.
Five of these slots are good orbital positions, allowing the U.S. to supply
half CONUS (continental U.S. coverage). These locations (101', 110,
119, 148, and 157') also have adequate elevation angles.5 7 Of the remaining slots, the 175* and 166* locations cannot serve the mountain time
zone and have low elevation angles which means that rain or other obstructions could cause signal interference, and the 61.5' slot has an eclipse protection problem which will occasionally deprive the satellite of power.58
The U.S. was not the only advanced country to make concessions regarding orbital slots. The Canadians also had to accept two easterly satel-

53. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
54. B. PATTAN, supra note 42, at 16.
55. Id. at 21. This beam involved transmitting common viable information to several Caribbean nations. In addition, each country would be assigned at least four of the 32 channels of
a satellite. Id.
56. GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 11.
57. B. PATTAN, supra note 42, at 26.
58. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 24. The easternmost slot, at 61.5"W, has poor
eclipse-time protection during the fall and spring equinoxes. The satellite would go dark as
early as 9:23 p.m. and remain dark for as long as 72 minutes while the earth passes between
the sun and the satellite and prevents the sun's rays from reaching the satellite's solar-powered
batteries. Id.
See illustration of the United States' slots at APPENDIX II.
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9

Power Flux Density and Polarization

Opinions diverged substantially regarding the power flux density (pfd)
standard. Canada and Brazil favored a standard lower (minus 107 pfd to
the square meter) than the United States' proposal (minus 105 pfd to the
square meter). The two proposals represent a difference in power of 60 percent.60 The U.S. stressed the importance of the higher standard to help
stimulate the domestic DBS market by accommodating a high-definition
television service and enhancing the quality of television color.6' Canada
and Brazil, however, have different priorities than the U.S. Both Canada
and Brazil preferred the lower standard because of their particular concern
about "spill-over" from surrounding countries.62 In addition, in Canada, 80
percent of the homes have cable television; therefore, they prefer a less expensive and lower power system. Moreover, in Brazil the very heavy rainfall
makes a lower power system more advantageous. When the RARC-83 selected the lower 107 pfd standard, the U.S. refused to acquiesce, claiming a
reservation on this issue."
The U.S. also refused to join the compromise decision to separate each
channel by alternating polarization directions. "The United States proposed
that polarization be left unspecified to allow the combination of channels to
give enough frequency capacity for the domestic industry's proposed and
enhanced television formats;" the RARC-83 agreement for polarization of
the 32 channels requires that each channel must be specified in either 6 a4
clockwise or counterclockwise directiori to provide channel discrimination.

59. B. PATTAN, supra note 42, at 16. See also Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
60. Back from Geneva, supra note 44, at 27; Georgetown, supra note 16, at 103; U.S.
Outvoted at RARC on DBS Power Standard, BROADCASTING, July 18, 1983, at 25 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Outvoted].
61. U.S. Outvoted, supra note 60, at 26.
62. Id. A lower power would be adequate to transmit DBS signals to large antennas for
relay to Canadian cable television. However for high rain areas such as Brazil, high satellite
power cost would be prohibitive because of rain attenuation. B. PATTAN, supra note 42, at 8.
63. Back from Geneva, supra note 44, at 27. "A reservation on an ITU agreement means
that a nation takes exception to a specific decision of the conference and gives notice as to how
it will act on the disagreement." GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 9. Thus, the U.S. can
launch high-power satellites as long as they do not violate the plan's interference standard. E.
MCWHINNEY, supra note 12, at 61.
64. GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 11. Polarization is "the plane in which signals are
transmitted." Id. at 9. It is "a feature of the transmitting antenna. The plan requires that the
polarization of any given channel be specified in either a clockwise or counterclockwise direction to provide a measure of discrimination between channels of service. The U.S. proposed
that polarization of a given channel be specified in either direction as a means of affording the
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Again, the U.S. took a reservation.
3.

Interim System

The U.S. and its allies, Mexico and Brazil, persuaded the conference to
allow the introduction of an interim broadcast system and to provide permissive procedures for its introduction.6 5 Under such a system, countries
may broadcast on frequencies allocated to other nations with the permission
of those nations. 66 This adds a great deal of flexibility to the overall plan
because countries may use satellite assignments with characteristics different from those specified in the plan, provided they adhere to interference
limits. In addition, "a satellite's interference to other designated satellite
assignments not in use may be disregarded until the other country notifies
the ITU that it intends to use the assignment. 6 1 7 Controversy may arise,
however, when a country notifies the ITU of its intention to use a designated assignment which is currently experiencing interference from another
country's system.
The Canadian interim system proposal, which would have protected
existing interim assignments beyond the U.S. plan's prescribed protections
for permanent assignments, was rejected. Had the proposal been accepted,
it would have preserved the "first-come, first-served" approach, but its
adoption was successfully blocked by the U.S., which supported the more
flexible method.6"
4.

Political Disputes

Most of the concessions made by the nations participating in RARC83 were technical in nature. There was, however, one important extraneous
political issue involving the Falkland Islands dispute. While the Master
Register relegates the geostationary orbit above the Falklands to the United
Kingdom, Argentina wanted to raise a claim of sovereignty over that orbit
at the Conference. 9 The United Kingdom maintained that the dispute was

flexibility that would be gained from combining channels." Back from Geneva, supra note 44,
at 26-27.
65. Countries opposed to this approach include Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia. Consensus
in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
66. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25. "Although this procedure may require the
consent of other nations, the process is less formal than that required for modifications of the
plan." GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 8.
67. GAO, OBJECTIVES, supra note 6, at 10.
68. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
69. This claim was initially raised in the Declaration of Equatorial States, signed in Bo-

gotd, Colombia, on December 3, 1946, I.T.U. 1977
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Doc. No. 81.
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a juridical matter which was beyond the reach of the conference's power.
The IFRB accepted the United Kingdom's argument because the ITU Radio Regulations require strict adherence to the Master Register. 70 Thus the
conference quickly skirted the "political crossfire."
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF

A.

RARC-83

FOR DBS SERVICE IN THE UNITED
STATES

Administration by the FCC

In the United States, frequency allocations to individual service providers are coordinated on both a national and an international level. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which determines the allocation
at the national level, must act within the constraints set by the ITU. 71
Under the auspices of the ITU, the RARC-83 has enabled the FCC72 to
authorize eight United States companies to construct satellite systems.
Between April 21, 1981 and the RARC-83, in June 1983, the FCC
promulgated Interim Rules for DBS operations and licensing, pursuant to
Title III of the Communications Act of 1934.73 The FCC's DBS policy is
based on a flexible regulatory approach, "[t]hus, the Interim Rules impose[d] a minimum number of regulatory requirements on applicants for
licenses to operate DBS systems. '7 These rules, however, were changed to
accommodate RARC-83 requirements.
On June 1, 1981, the FCC released a Proposed Policy Statement and
Rulemaking, setting forth "proposed policies and conditions to govern the
authorization of interim BSS services," and accepted an application from
the Satellite Television Corporation (STC), a subsidiary of the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), requesting authority to begin
satellite construction for a satellite-to-home video broadcasting system.7 5 In
1982, the FCC granted STC and seven other first-round applicants condi-

ANNEX 4.

70. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
71.

E. DIAMOND, N.

SANDLER & M.

MUELLER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS

IN CRISIS: THE

74 (1983) [hereinafter cited as E. DIAMOND]. "The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal Communications Commission and gave it the responsibility and authority to regulate non-Government telecommunications." GAO, PREPARATIONS, supra note 41, app. I., at 3.
72. FCC, FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 6.
73. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-332 (1982).
74. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 77.
75. GAO, PREPARATIONS, supra note 41, app. I., at 8; Notice of Proposed Policy Statement and Rulemaking, 86 F.C.C.2d 719 (1981), Interim Direct Broadcast Satellite Applications, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,497 (1981).
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tional construction permits for the DBS system. The seven other DBS applicants were CBS, Inc., DBSC, Graphic, RCA, USSB, Videosat, and
Western Union.76 These companies were warned that they would have to
conform to RARC-83 revisions and requirements and could not be assigned
77
frequencies or orbital positions until after the conference.
The revision most likely to have affected the DBS applicants would
have been an assignment to the U.S. of fewer spectrum-orbits than those
already allocated. Because the U.S. was able to obtain the eight orbital
slots it requested, the FCC was correct in its judgment that RARC-83
78
would not significantly damage its interim authorizations.
B.

Present Orbital Allocations

At RARC-83 the U.S. fulfilled its geostationary orbital needs and frequency capacity and gained the flexibility it required as well. 79 Ambassador
Washburn, Chairman of the U.S. RARC-83 delegation, stated that the
needs of the eight approved DBS applicants and others could be met. 80
However, as noted, only five of the obtained orbital slots are trouble-free.
The westernmost locations at 175 and 166' are only capable of serving the
Pacific time zone, Alaska, and Hawaii, and their elevation angles are low,
which makes them susceptible to interference. Thus, they are much less
economical to use.8" The easternmost slot, 61.5°W, has the eclipsing problem, but Washburn believes that "by the time there is a demand for it,
technology might well have solved the battery problem. In the meantime
• . . it [can act as] a spare."82
Despite the eclipsing and interference problems, the FCC plans to treat
all orbital positions and frequencies within the relevant range as having
equal value in order "to prevent conflicts from arising over a particular frequency or orbital position." 83 Thus, the problems associated with the three
marginal orbital slots will not be taken into consideration, and the approved
applicant will have to bear the loss. The U.S. RARC-83 delegates believe
that the five slots "in the middle" will be the first chosen because each
"permit[s] coverage of half the country, as well as a single time zone." 8 4

76. FCC,

FACT SHEET,

supra note 3, at 6; Georgetown, supra note 16, at 89.

77. FCC,

FACT SHEET,

supra note 3, at 6.

78. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 79, 83.

79. GAO,

OBJECTIVES,

supra note 6, at 8.

80. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 24.

81. GAO,

OBJECTIVES,

supra note 6, at 11. See
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82. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 24.
83. Georgetown, supra note 16, at 81; codified at 47 C.F.R. § 100.13(b) (1982).
84. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 24. The 61.5'W location is also "half-
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GROWTH

The U.S. delegates believe that the RARC-83 plan is flexible enough
to meet future U.S. requirements, as well as present ones. The plan allows
an interim system to operate for 12 years, with a possible two year extension, as long as the system does not cause interference, or if agreement of
the affected country is obtained. In addition, the plan can be modified so
that a new system can be introduced without any other country's agreement, if it does not cause interference.8 5
Washburn has concluded that the plan is a "major achievement." 86 In
fact, while an advisory committee of industry experts has predicted that the
U.S. will need between 68 and 215 channels of DBS service by the end of
this century, the RARC-83 plan has already given the U.S. "256 channels-on the basis of 32 for each of the eight orbital slots."'87 Thus, as
Washburn states, the plan provides amply for the United States' present
and future needs.88
RARC-83 concluded by adopting a high capacity plan for the Western
Hemisphere which is very favorable to DBS growth in the United States. In
fact, "[w]hat evolved for the U.S. was a flexible a priori plan in which
entire blocks of frequencies are assigned to a service area, with specific
channel and polarization assignments."8 However, the U.S. need not follow
these specific restrictions because it took reservations on both polarization
and power flux density. 0 The U.S. is thus able to tailor its systems to its
own needs.
If, as expected, 91 the RARC-83 recommended plan is approved at
WARC-85, it will pave the way for DBS development and market success.
The channel capacity seems more than adequate for the United States' present needs, and the plan's flexibility will help facilitate and encourage future growth. In fact, DBS "could develop into a multibillion dollar industry
in the United States by the end of the decade" with this approach. 92
Daphne D. Duverney

CONUS" but its current eclipsing problem makes it the least desirable.
85. Consensus in Geneva, supra note 43, at 25.
86. Back from Geneva, supra note 44, at 26.
87. Id.
88. Id.

89. B. PATrAN, supra note 38, at 27.
90. Id. The power flux density reservation will allow the U.S. to use a higher power standard which will enable greater signal coverage per channel.
91. Telephone interview with Bruce Franca, Mass Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission (March 6, 1985).
92. GAO, PREPARATIONS, supra note 41, at 2.
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APPENDIX II
North-America DBS Satellite Locations (RARC-83)
O
o

0

: U.S.A. (175W, 166, 157,
0

CANADA (138 W, 129,

148,

91, 82,

119,

110,

72.5, 70.5)

0

101,

61.5),[these locations may support
multiple U.S. satellites
(clustering)]

A
MEXICO (136 W, 127, 78, 69)
Note: Other Administration satellites are interposed, but not shown.

B. PATTAN, supra note 42, at 18.

